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ABSTRACT 
·Traditional inheritance customs of village communities,can be viewed as 
rules governing intergenerational wealth transfers. Parents' choices among 
education,.· land, and nonland assets as transfers to children are modeled 
assuming individualistic,preferences of parents in an agriculturalhousehold. 
Empirical evidence is provided from a retrospective survey of five rice­
growing villages in the Philippines. Parental gender preference in 
inheritance decisions is examined using family fixed effects estimates with 
interactions between gender of the child and parental endowments. Results 
indicate that, in level terms, daughters receive more education and total 
inheritance but less land. When family fixed effects are accounted for, 
however, education is gender-neutral, nonland asset transfers weakly favor 
daughters, and sons receive higher values of·land and total inheritance. 
Interactions of child gender with parent endowments are relatively unimportant 
determinants of educational levels, although they are significant in bestowals 
of nonhuman capital. Daughters of better educated mothers, land-owning 
fathers, and land-owning mothers receive higher levels of land and nonland 
assets. On the other hand, better educated fathers and parents cultivating 
larger areas tend to bestow land and nonland assets preferentially to sons. 
Key words: intergenerational transfers, bargaining models, agricultural 
households 
Subject index: economic demography and labor economics; agriculture, 
technical change and science policy 
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INTERGENERATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFERS IN PHILIPPINE RICE VILLAGES: 
Gender Differences in Traditional InheritanceCustoms 1 
Agnes R. Quisumbing 
1. Introduction 
The process of intergenerational wealth transmission in rural societies 
is manifested in traditional inheritance customs and practices of village 
communities. · Substitution among children, land rights, and human capital as 
alternative forms of holding wealth,; and differences in wealth-holding by men 
and women have profound implications on both intra- and intergenerational 
inequality, occupational mobility, and migration. 
In the rural Philippines, for example, transfers made by parents at the 
time of their children's marriage may·have a significant impact on respective 
spouses' subsequent bargaining power. Land plays an important part in 
marriage among rural families. A parcel of land usually forms the main 
portion of the bride gift, or male land dowry, and is among several points 
bargained for between parents at the time of the formal marriage proposal 
(Anderson 1962; Scheans 1965; Lewis 1971). Other assets, like farm animals, 
residential lots, or a residential house, may also be provided to the 
1Research supported by the Rockefeller Foundation program on "Gender, the 
Family and Technical Change in Low-Income Countries," with the cooperation of 
the International Rice Research Institute. I am grateful to T. Paul Schultz and 
Duncan Thomas for comments and suggestions. Discussions with Donald Cox, 
Cristina David, Bob Evenson, Yuj iro Hayami, Kei Otsuka, and seminar participants 
at Yale, IRRI, and the World Bank have been valuable. Research assistance by 
Jonna Estudillo is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 
newlyweds as part of the fund needed to establish them as a separate family 
unit (Fegan 1982) . 2 Gifts and transfers.. at-'.:athe time of marriage, however,. are 
not the only transfers made by parents to-children, since they may have 
invested previously in their children's human ,capital. Transfer· .behavior by•,,, 
parents and gender differences in inheritance customs are therefore observed 
in educational levels and bestowals of land and other, assets to children. 
Differences in human capital investment and inherited assets may 
influence the bargaining position of household members and subsequent 
decisions taken with respect to fertility, schooling, and transfers to 
children. Bargaining models of the household posit that individually-owned 
assets and the incomes therefrom may be significant determinants of household 
behavior. Empirical applications of the Nash-bargaining model provide 
evidence for differential effects of male and female unearned incomes on 
leisure choice (Horney and McElroy 1988), and in developing countries, on 
fertility and the probability that a woman engages in wage labor (Schultz 
1990) and on family health outcomes (Thomas 1990a; 1990b). 
Although there is evidence for gender differences in household resource 
allocation to children, it is not clear whether this is the result of genetic 
or ability differences, parental response to expected gender wage 
differentials, systematic differences by gender in the cost of investment in 
2 In his account of frontier life in a Central Luzon barrio, Fegan (1982:99) 
states: "In the marriage negotiations between parents, each family stated what 
components of their establishment fund it would be responsible for in a process 
of matching contributions of goods and labor. Aside from workbeasts, other farm 
equipment could be made by skilled older kinsmen. Kinsmen could also 
cooperate in the initial clearing of a farm, building a house, and making 
essential household equipment." 
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children, or parental gender preference (Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 1986). 3 
While parental allocation of human capital investment inay mildly reinforce 
gender wage differentials in the United States, this is offset by parental 
preferences which exhibit equal ..concern for or<slightly favor·..girls :(.Behrman,c­
Pollak and Taubman 1986). Discrimination against females in the 
· intrahousehold distribution of..-nutrients is,· not..,supported by .,the ,equivalence.". 
scale literature (Deaton 1989, cited in Thomas 1990a) at least in Cote 
d'Ivoire and may be due to different activity levels (Pitt, Rosenzweig and 
Hassan 1990). Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) find differential adjustment of 
male a:hd'female··nutrient intakes to changes in food prices in India, but their 
data'do not show lower average nutrient intakes-nor higher variances in 
females over males. In contrast, Thomas (1990a, 1990b), using data from the. 
United States, Brazil, and Ghana, finds that mother's education has-a bigger 
impact on daughter's height than on son's height, while father's education 
affects son's height more. 
Intergenerational wealth transfers from parents to children are analyzed 
in five rice-growing villages in the Philippines. An additional perspective 
is obtained by modeling the intergenerational transfer as the outcome of 
bargaining between parents. 4 This approach differs from common preference 
models of intergenerational transfers where a single parent or both parents 
3Behrman et al. (1986: 33) define gender preference to mean that parents 
value identical outcomes at identical cost more highly for one sex than for the 
other. 
4The use of a bargaining model to describe interactions within Philippine 
households can be justified since smooth interpersonal relations are not attached 
to established rules or ideals, nor to an ethical system, but are maintained 
through negotiation (Lewis 1971:84). The' result is a "social pragmatism" in 
negotiating conflict avoidance and adjusting social relations to accomodate 
.changes in .the. life. cycle or family. fortunes .(Lopez 1991 :.. 7). 
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acting collectively make transfers to children due to altruism (Becker 1974; 
Becker and Tomes 1979}. 'It also- departs ,from more- recent studies which have, 
modeled transfers as outcomes of strategic behavior between parents and 
children (Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers 1985;·Cox-1987; Cox and Jimenez 
1990). This paper focuses on gender differences in transfers received, in the 
forms of, education, land -and -nonland assets. •- Parental-- gender preference,. in 0-:,, 
inheritance decisions is examined using family fixed effects estimates with 
interactions between gender of the child and endowments of the parents. 
Empirical evidence is provided from a sample of 331 households with 2241 
children in five Philippine rice-growing villages. A retrospective survey was 
conducted from July>to October -1989 to acquire family-inheritance histories ,..y; 
for three generations, namely the parents', children's (respondents') and 
grandchildren's generations.·- Data is available on .parents' characteristics, 
schooling and inheritance of the respondent and siblings, and on the 
respondent's spouse and children. This paper focuses on decisions made by the 
·parents of current•·respondents, since fertility decisions;· .. and.most 
inheritance and schooling decisions, would have been completed by the time of 
the survey. 
The agricultural household model (Singh, Squire, Strauss 1986) is 
modified to consider intergenerational wealth transfers (Becker and Tomes 
1979, Tornes 1981) and a bargaining approach to household decision making 
(McElroy and Horney 1981, Manser and Brown 1981), although we do not impose a 
particular bargaining rule on the decision-making process. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on intergenerational transfers and presents a model of 
intergenerational wealth transfers for an agricultural household in which 
5 
.parents have individual preferences. Part 3 describes the data and presents 
the regression -results for both level. and ,family fixed effects ,estimates, .._,.,, ,:, ,:.,. 
Part 4 presents the summary and conclusions. A data appendix-describes the 
study villages in greater detail. 
2. Intergenerational Wealth Transfers and the Agricultural·· Household , .,·· ,_,_.,.,,:._., 
2.1 Theories of Intergenerational Transfers 
Inheritance rules can be viewed as an intergenerational contract between 
parents and children. The l~terature on private income transfers suggests 
three mcftTves •''for ·intergenerational· transfers: altruism, exchange, and 
insurance. In the altruistic model (Becker 1974, Becker and Tomes 1979), a 
benevolent individual (parent) cares about the well being of other individuals 
(children) and makes -transfers to. them. In this modeL, parents maximize a 
utility function spanning generations, in which utility depends on the , 
consumption of parents and the quantity and quality of children. Parents 
curtail current -consumption due to· altruistic -concern for their children and.:,>, 
maximize utility by choosing optimal investments in the human and nonhuman 
capital of children. 
The parental utility function can be written as 
(1) 
where C is the number of children, z 0 is per capita consumption of children 
when they become adults, zP is parental consumption, and zi is consumption 
of goods and leisure by parents and children, zi = (xi, li). Typically, 
child consumption is assumed equal across children in the same family and zP 
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is treated as the aggregate of parents' consumption, without any distinction 
.between consumption by individual parents. 
An income generating function for children is·specified as 
g + f)(E, g) + a g + k + a 
where children's consumption exhausts their income, defined as the sum of 
child's endowed income g (a function of genetic endowments), earnings from 
human capital k, and asset income a (Tomes 1981). Earnings are the product of 
'a ·human ca.p'i'ta.1:'•¼·production function defined over a parental efficiency 
. parameter f3, education E and the genetic endowment g. 
The income constraint is 
where income of parents ,YP is spent .on parental consumption of. goods ¾ 
(the numeraire), and expenditures on education and material transfers, p
9 
CE + 
The price of education is Pe per head, C is the number of children, 
and Eis educational investment per child. With regard to asset transfers, Pa 
is the price of the asset and A is the amount of assets transferred per child. 
In most models which assumealtruism, a parent maximizes (1) subject to (2) 
and (3) to obtain the optimal number of children and optimal investments in 
human and physical capital per child. 
In their model of intergenerational transfers, Behrman, Pollak and 
Taubman (1982) introduce the notion for parental preferences for intersibling 
equality in their choice of human capital investment and material transfers. 
7 
They argue that parental preference leads to schooling outcomes different from 
-. a .wealth ·model of investment, given differences in genetic endowments among 
children. Thus; depending ori the value of the parental preference parameter, 
parents may choose investment (schooling) strategies which may reinforce, 
compensate, or be neutral with respect to the child's genetic endowments. 
Empirical application toa sample of adult male twins yields the result that, 
parents care about offsprings' earnings inequality and provide more (less) 
resources to the less (more) able than is consistent with a purely return 
maximizing investment model. 
In later work, Behrman et al. (1989) examine the Becker-Tomes wealth 
model with equal parent concern for all children and the implications of the 
availability of parental resources for human capital and financial transfers 
to children.·· According .to the 'Wealth model, if parental resources are large· 
enough, parents can provide each.child with the wealth maximizing level of 
education and use (unequal) financial transfers to equalize present discounted 
value·of children's income; However, if parents are resource-constrained, the 
wealth model implies that parents will allocate transfers unequally among 
children, do not equalize the present discounted value of children's income, 
and do not necessarily provide each child with the wealth-maximizing level of 
education. Behrman et al. do not find empirical evidence to support the 
predictions of the wealth,model, since disinheritance and unequal sharing of 
estates among siblings are not the norm in the United States. They argue 
that the Becker and Tornes model add together earnings and returns from 
financial assets for each child, while their own study treats these as 
separable arguments in the parents' utility function. 
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Altruistic models of family behavior have been criticized for not taking 
into account nonaltruistic .motives of parents to. provide. transfers to .their,.,· 
• children. 5 In exchange models of intergenerational transfers, the parental', ,. 
utiiity function .is defined. over parentai consumption.and child--consumption, .. 
but also includes parental consumption of child services,·the provision.of 
which causes disutilityto the child. 6 ,The parent's.utility..function,is.,,,.,c,c,. 
where Up, 'zp, and zc:: ·are as defined above, s is child services and V is the 
. child's level of well-being, defined over zc and s. Both parental and child, 
consumption are normal goods, and 8Up/8V > 0, indicating that parents are 
altruistic. However,· while parents enjoy child services (8Up/8s ·> 0), their 
provision causes disutility to the.child (8V/8s < 0). It is over the 
provision of child services that motives for transfers may depart from pure 
altruism. · ·Whether or not' the parents act altruistically or strategically. is ,. 
determined by the constraint 
5In the exchange model of Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985), for 
example, the parent makes transfers to children in return for services received 
from them. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) view the family as an incomplete 
annuities market, where children make regular transfers to their parents, and 
the share that each child contributes to the parents determinces his or her share 
of the parental estate. Pollak's (1988) model of tied transfers and 
paternalistic preferences is midway between the altruistic and exchange models. 
Pollak argues that parents care about their children's consumption even after 
the children have grown up and left home, and use tied transfers to influence 
the children's consumption of particular goods and services. 
6This exposition follows Cox (1987) closely. 
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that is, whether the child's utility when providing services is greater than.-· 
his/her reservation utility or "threat point," defined over child's income 
(without transfers) and no provision of child services. If .(5) is not. 
binding, transfer behavior is altruistic and the child's gain is strictly 
positive. Otherwise,-, transfers provide compensation for child ,services,.... ,,.cox, 
(1987) tests altruism versus exchange motives using a data set on inter-vivos 
transfers for the United States. A negative relationship between pretransfer 
income and transfers suggests altruism, while a positive relationship signals 
· '· •"· the ·presence'i<of-;c-,exchange motives. His results -support the idea that inter­
vivos transfers· are payments for services exchanged among family units ... 
Other studies on intergenerational transfers (Cox and Jimenez 1991) have 
explicitly incorporated the -,idea of bargaining between parents and children .. 
Suppose that parents and children are mutually altruis_tic. The parents' 
utility function is defined over own consumption xp and child utility V: 
and child utility is defined over child consumption and parent utility 
(7) V 
Assuming imperfect capital markets, a common subjective rate of time 
preference, and the possibility that parents lend to children in the latter's 
youth in return for transfers received in their old age, Cox and Jimenez 
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(1991) suggest that the terms of the intergenerational loan are determined.by 
Nash bargaining. Parents and children choose transfers to maximize 
(8) N 
where Up° and V0 are the utilities obtained by .parents and chi·ldren on their 
own. Cox and Jimenez's empirical results for urban Peru support the presence 
of altruistic motives at low levels of pretransfer income and exchange motives 
at higher levels of pretransfer income. 
Finally, the insurance motive for wealth transfers views the family as a 
means .. for diversifying against .risk. This view is especially prevalent in the 
literature on the family in developing countries. For example, Rosenzweig 
(1988) argues' that family structure and kinship ties are sustained over space 
and time in implicit insurance-based schemes to smooth incomes in the face of. 
covariant income risks. Such familial transfer arrangements are preferred to 
the use of credit markets, particularly· by households able to self-insure 
because of their ability to accumulate wealth. Moreover, the 
intergenerationally extended nature of farm families and the prevalence of 
inheritance rather than land market sales are viewed as ways of capturing 
returns to specific experience by farm families (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). 
Testing alternative models of intergenerational transfers in a 
developing country will require a formulation to take into account not only 
the differences in risk faced by families, but also the existence of imperfect 
asset markets which may constrain the form in which wealth is held and in 
which transfers are made. The absence of a well-developed financial system 
may increase the desirability of nonfinancial assets, especially land, as 
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forms of transferring wealth. In the absence of modern property _rights, or 
,the existence of institutional constraints on;" these rights (such as land. 
-reform laws forbidding the sale of tenancy rights), even usufruct rights. to 
land acquire the status of an asset. Children.are also viewed.as an.assetAn 
rural economies; variables .positively associated with returns .. to .child labor- -
size of landholding, agricultural .productivity,. and.,wage rates--have..been_.., 
shown to be positively related to fertility and negatively related to child 
schooling (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977). 
Education is another form in which parents may transfer wealth to their 
·children.· 'TnY'"'developing countries, educational investment is motivated 
partly by altruism, but may also be due to the parents' desire to capture 
returns to children's schooling. Agricultural parents may want to diversify 
the family's 'occupational -.portfolio .by investing· in children's education•, 
since better educated 0 children have better chances of moving into a 
nonagricultural occupation for which returns may covary less with agricultural 
•incomes and ·thus provide insurance to smooth fluctuations· in family income.··,. 
Parents in rural areas may also invest preferentially in family members (e.g. 
children of the head) who have higher probabilities of making remittances from 
urban incomes than other members (sons- or daughters-in law, or even spouses). 
In Botswana, remittances from own young are significantly higher than among 
all absentee members of the household, supporting the notion.that remittances 
are partly a result of an intergenerational contract to repay initial 
educational investments (Lucas and Stark 1985). 
Although recent studies of intergenerational transfers have incorporated 
the notion of bargaining between parents and children, they do not recognize 
individualistic preferences of parents or asymmetries in parents' bargaining 
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position (Manser and Brown 1981; McElroy and Horney 1981; McElroy 1990). Most 
·of the·above studies do.not distinguish,betweenutility functions.of 
individual parents. · In other words, while.bargaining·between parents and 
children has been admitted, these studies usually hold that ..parents ..have.. · 
common preferences. 
A number .of .. studies-.,have relaxed the neoclassical assumption •,of .common 
preferences between husband and wife in household decision-making. McElroy 
and Horney's (1988) Nash bargaining formulation relaxes the restriction that 
nonearned incomes of husband and wife have identical effects on family labor 
· sup'p'ly arid corriinodity demands; this restriction is empirically rejected for 
·female·-labor supply· and.fertility in.Thailand (Schultz 1990). · Thomas (1990an· 
1990b) examines the differential effects of father's and mother's endowments 
on sonsand daughters'·health in the;United States;·Ghana and Brazil, ·and 
points out greater impact of parents' endowments on children of the same 
gender . 
. It has been argued .(Chiappori 1988a, ·1988b) that the Nash-bargaining 
assumption is overly restrictive and does not yield easily testable 
restrictions, unless the pre-marital (indirect) utility function is known. In 
addition, McElroy and Horney assume independence of pre- and post-marital 
preferences. In consequence, unless preferences are known, Nash bargaining 
implies only·Pareto optimality of·household decisions. Thus,··one need only':,;• 
assume Pareto efficiency in household allocation outcomes. Even if the Nash­
bargaining solution (if it exists) may be reached through more complicated 
processes of sequential bargaining (Harsanyi and Selten 1987), one does not 
need to assume a particular bargaining rule to test the common preference 
model of household decision-making. If we assume only that household 
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allocations are Pareto efficient, but parents have different preferences, 
household demands should _be affected only by prices and individual components-
of unearned income (Thomas 1990a). That is, the optimal' household demands x-i* 
are: 
(9) Xi * 
where pis a vector of prices, and I 1 , ... , Im are unearned incomes of 
individuals 1 tom. One can therefore test the common preference model 
against a''broad-cla:ss -of alternatives by testing for the equality of unearned 
income effects. 
Suppose that the desired number of children, education, and transfers 
•are outcomes .'of household decision making,_, and that parents have 
individualistic preferences. It is possible that these outcomes will be 
affected by differences in parents' bargaining power, and that realizations 
among sons and daughters will be likewise affected. Different preferences in 
intergenerational transfers to sons and daughters could then be manifested in 
observed inheritance outcomes. This paper aims to provide econometric 
evidence on inheritance rules in rural Philippine households. Are male heirs 
favored in land and asset inheritance? Do differences in father's and 
mother's individual endowments and child characteristics affect household 
allocation decisions among sons and daughters? If daughters are not favored 
in land inheritance, are other forms of transfers (schooling or assets) meant 
to offset this bias? We attempt to answer these questions in the remainder of 
the paper. 
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2.2 The Model 
·Consider·.an,,·agricultural;.household:.with,'two ,adult 0 members (parents);,,..,., .. 
Parents decide on the desired number of children and levels of education and 0 , 
asset transfers to them. ,We,assume individualistic ,preferences--the-,..father ., 
and mother have their own utility functions--and individual sources of 
unearned·income; The, demand for· goods, leisure, ,the .desired •number. of 
children and optimal levels of education and asset transfers can be expressed 
as: 
* * *(10a) Xi x\'(p, w f• Wm• L, If, Im ) 
* . (10b) 1*i l\(p, w * f• Wm• L, If, Im ) 
*(10c) c* c*(p, w * f• Wm• L, If, Im ) 
*(10d) E* =, E*(p, * L, If, Im )w f• Wm• 
*(lOe) A* A*(p, w * f• Wm• L, If, Im ) 
where pis a vector of prices of consumption goods, including the cost of 
education Pe and assets Pa, wi * is the shadow wage rate, Lis a vector 
of fixed inputs, such as land, and If are unearned incomes of 
father and mother respectively. 7 The shadow wage rate is endogenously 
determined by market prices, fixed inputs, and unearned income. Wages are 
endogenous because of the possibility-that an individual may.not participate· 
in the wage labor market. Since the w * i are endogenous, appropriate 
7Although area cultivated can be considered a choice variable in any 
cropping season, we assume that the landholding size (including cultivated and 
fallow land) is largely determined at the time of marriage, since farming 
households typically receive land rights as a marriage gift from parents, or 
enter into tenancy contracts prior to setting up a separate household. 
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.instruments must be found for them; candidates are parents' previous 
-·investment · in human• capital,·(cornpleted,schooling) ;,"/.individual unearned--incorne· 
or indicators thereof, such as individual land or asset ownership. 
Theoretically, the optimal quantities are derivedfrornsolving·the 
Hicksian demand functions simultaneously, given prices, virtual wages, 
unearned income, and .fixed inputs. .• In practice, however, · due·• to the 
sequential nature of decision-making over the life cycle, later decisions may 
be based on previous decisions, plus the realization of "luck" or deviations 
from the expected outcome. This added error, or changes in the initial 
conditions, could lead to a revision of earlier goals. For example, in the 
typical .family life. cycle, .completed fertility. is determined prior to the 
completion of investment in children's human capital; schooling may also be 
completed before the child's earning .capacity. is known '(Tornes 1981). Given. 
that, at the time bequests are made, parents' fertility is predetermined and 
human capital investment already precornrnitted, no adjustment of these choice· 
variables may be possible, so material transfers-.will have to adjust if 
decisions are revised. 
Thus, let us assume that parents decide completed family size in family 
j using the rule 
(11) c*.
J 
where a is a vector of other variables, such as parental tenure, irrigation, 
or location. Educational investment in child i of family j will then take 
into account the number of children c*.J as well as the parental efficiency 
parameter f)j: 
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* w * f, Wm• 
and asset transfers, in- turn-, will be· conditioned on the number· of·thildrerr~·-· 
c*j and previous investment in their human capital E\j: 
* w f• C * j' 
In practice, C* j, E* ij, and A\j are all affected by the same 
·unobservables/· such as-preferences, and could have common error components. 
It is-.difficulL to .find variables which would affect some of the. decisions...,,, 
exclusively in order to impose identifying restrictions. For example, it 
·_·---could~-he-ar-gued-c.-that~parentsc:"may+grant_:smalle.L'heque.sts'--to--'--childr_en_:who.::dllarr,¥-·--­
weal thier spouses. But to the extent that family formation is an endogenous 
process and depends on individual characteristics such as marital 
attractiveness and educational attainment (Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984), · ·~ 
spousal characteristics or even child's marital status is not exogenous. 8 
Even the provision of child services is not independent of previous parental 
decisions; better educated children may be more able to provide old age 
support, or children not in the labor market may have more time to spend 
visiting parents. If one assumes that previous levels are predetermined and: 
that errors are not correlated across equations, then the model can be 
8In the rural Philippines, for example, marriage partners are chosen to a 
great extent with an eye for equivalent or higher status. The institution of 
the salonson (formal marriage proposal in Pangasinan) is purely a meeting for 
economic bargaining between parents before marriage plans are allowed to proceed 
further. Land rights may be withheld by parents if they disapprove of a son's 
choice of bride (Anderson 1962: 54). 
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estimated recursively. Alternatively, one can estimate reduced form equations 
and express family outcomes .as. a function. mainly of .·parental, characteristics 
at the time of marriage. Weuse the second method, but also include a vector 
of child characteristics such as gender, birth year, dummies.for eldest or 
youngest child, and interactions between gender and birth order. 
2.3 Empirical Specification 
We assume that parents can transfer wealth through human capital 
investment (education), land rights (usufruct rights or land ownership), and 
nonland assets. 9 The reduced form equations are expressed as a function of 
parental endowments in·the fertility equation and of both parent endowments 
and child,characteristics in the education, .land, and.nonland asset transfer 
equations. 
The fertility equation can be written .as 
(14) c* 
where c* is completed ·family size, defined as number of children ever born ... , 
minus child deaths below age five, and Xf and x.ii are vectors of parental 
endowments at the time of marriage, such as education, size of land owned, 
and area cultivated or joint landholding at the time of marriage. We study 
completed family size rather than number of children ever born because we are 
9Most of these are inter-vivos transfers, since parents usually transfer the 
land right to their children while the former are still living, usually when the 
child gets married. Single children generally claim their rights only after the 
final division of the estate; i.e. after their parents' death, since they 
continue to live in the parental household while unmarried. The exception occurs 
if the child worked in a distant location. In their old age, however, parents 
usually stay with the youngest child, who then inherits the parental house. 
Since bestowal of land rights is linked to marriage, it can be argued that the 
decision to marry may be motivated partly by the desire to realize claims to 
land. 
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unable to measure confidently child mortality and replacement fertility with 
our data. Individual landownership is our~indicator of individual asset 
positions, because area cultivated exclusively by women.is not common in the. 
·Philippines, but landownership by women is widespread. Area cultivated-at.the 
time of marriage, on the other hand, is a measure of .family income.generating 
capacity in agriculture. .Lastly, since we are .looking at a sample whose 
family sizes have been completed by the time of the survey ( the youngest 
child in the sample was born in 1980), we do not include mother's age as a 
regressor to take into account differential fertility across age cohorts. A 
linear·tren:d·across"cohorts in completed fertility is captured by mother's 
year of birth. 
Level Estimates. 
Education and wealth.,transfer. decisions involve not only parental 
endowments but also child characteristics and their interaction with parental 
endowments ..· Thus, we specify the levels of education, land and assets 
received by child i in family j as: 
(15) E * ij el + ezXeij + e3Xfj + e4~j + esXfjXeij + e6~jxeij + €2 
(16) L*ij 11 + lzXeij + l3Xfj + 14~j + lsXfjXeij + 16~jxeij + €3 
*(17) A ij al + azXeij + a3Xfj + a4~j + asXfjXeij + a6~jxeij + €4 
where Xe is a vector of child characteristics such as gender, birth year, 
and dummies for the eldest or youngest child, and XfXe and Ve are 
interaction terms for child gender and parent endowments, i indexes the 
child, j indexes the family, and <:i is the error term in each equation. 
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Birth year is included as an explanatory variable to account for possible time 
trends in environmental conditions, such as the availability of education.'· 
Family Fixed Effect Specification. 
Level estimatesdo'not adequately capture·the effects of family level 
variables that may influence the capacity of parents to transfer assets.to 
their children. Aside from endowments at,the time of marriage, assets 
accumulated by the couple over their adult life cycle would affect their 
ability to make bestowals. However, many of these family-specific variables 
are not observed. Should these omitted family level variables be correlated 
with those'included,in the previous model, their estimated effects on 
•. transfers may be biased. For those families with at least two children, the 
within family allocation may be the critical source of variation in the sample 
from which to estimate gender differences in transfers. 10 
Consequently, we adopt a fixed effect specification that includes a 
family "effect". One way of accounting for family fixed effects is to 
introduce dummy variables for those omitted variables that are specific to 
each family. 11 An equivalent method is to estimate the slope parameters using 
first differences in the dependent and explanatory variables. We simply 
compute the means of the individual observations for each family unit, 
transform the observed variables by subtracting out the family means Yj and Xj 
for the dependent and independent variables, respectively, and apply least 
squares to the transformed data. In this specification, the effect of family 
10We choose families with at least two children of both sexes so that 
eldest, youngest, and gender dummies are relevant in the family fixed effects 
specification. 
11See Hsiao (1986: 29-31) for a more detailed exposition. 
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variables that do not vary across children cannot be identified, such as 
parent endowments at marriage or residential location. However, the effects 
of these variables may be estimated to the· extent-. that· they impact differently 
on children of different ,gender. Thus, in our specific application, •:only the · 
child's gender, eldest and youngest dummies, interaction between child gender 
and birth order, ·the child gender and parent endowment interaction ·.terms;· and 
the birth year difference ( difference between the child's birth year and the 
average birth year within the family) remain as explanatory variables in the 
family fixed effects specification. 
3. An Application to the Philippines 
3.1 Data 
Data were obtained from- a retrospective survey of 344 sample households­
in five selected villages, which were randomly selected and intensively 
surveyed by the International Rice Research Institute (IRR!) in 1985. 12 A 
complete village census was initially conducted in 1984 to obtain general ,. 
information on farm and household characteristics, demographic data, migration 
histories, and changes in tenancy and landownership status. A sample survey 
of farming and landless households was then conducted twice, pertaining to the 
dry (January to May) and wet (June to December) seasons of 1985. The sample 
households were selected from the population list stratified by migration 
status and farm size for farm households and by migration status and family 
size for landless households. Although the choice of stratification variables 
is debatable, this study resurveyed the sample as it was initially surveyed by 
12Results of the survey on rice production and income distribution are 
reported by Otsuka, Cordova and David (1990). 
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IRRI. 13 The 1985 IRRI sample consisted of 300 farming households and 96 
landless households; due to outmigration the sample size was reduced to 344 as 
of 1989 . 14 · Since the initial survey focused on rice farming practices,· heads 
of households (usually· male) were chosen ·as respondents; --this···may··have -led'•to 
a larger number of observations on males compared to females in the 1989 .. 
survey. ,The retrospectivesurvey·included questions on the .parents,.siblings, 
and children of the respondents, yielding information on three generations 
which we term the parents', children's and grandchildren's generations. The 
survey enable us to match 331 sets of parents with 2241 offspring for the 
'chi'ldren'''s·'gerreration·),~· Familiarity of the enumerators with the sample 
· •respondents -and .their, spouses. established· through repeated interviews greatly,i 
facilitated the resurvey in 1989. 
Two villages are located in.Central Luzon, while three villages are in 
Panay Island. These villages are typical rice growing villages in these 
regions, and the whole area is planted to rice during the wet season (June ·to 
December). Rice cultivation during the dry season depends on the availability 
of irrigation. Cropping patterns, irrigation facilities, tenure distribution, 
13Migration and family size are inappropriate stratifying variables since 
both are endogenous to family decisions. To some extent, since farm size may 
be limited by land reform regulations, this may be considered exogenous, although 
informal land pawning agreements may change actual area cultivated in a given 
season. It is perhaps more accurate to state that land legally acquired through 
land reform is subject to award limits and is exogenous. 
14No attempt was made to replace respondents because we wanted to match 
present respondents with previously collected records on family histories. 
15we only included observations for which information was complete. Due to 
the nature of the retrospective survey, it was difficult for some respondents 
to recall some of the information being requested. Estimation was also carried 
out on set of smaller subsamples; this will be discussed later in the text. 
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and modes of land acquisition are discussed in greater detail in the 
Appendix. 
A summary of family,' parent,· and child characteristics·, classified-by,, 
father's tenure status at marriage ,is presented- in Table· l. , -Completed family 
size in the children's generation is 6.72, with mean.birth year.in.1940 .. The 
implied sex ratio of 1. 27 ·suggests that· more'· sons than daughters are ·• 
represented, and could be due to the choice of the household head (usually 
male) as respondent in the IRRI survey. On the average, fathers owned 1.42 
hectares at the time of marriage; mothers, 0.58 hectares. The average size of 
joint laridholdihg ''at '-the time of marriage, 3. 46 hectares, is larger than the 
sum of-,,father' s and .mother's owned· land because, of tenancy agreements . 16 On, 
the average, fathers tend to be better educated than mothers, with 3.69 and 
3. 16 years of schooling, respectively.. , This ..-trend is reversed in •the, next , 
generation, where daughters have 7.01 years of schooling and sons, only 6.54 
years. The gain in female education (daughter's education minus mother's 
education) is larger than the corresponding gain for males in-all tenure 
categories. 
Sons receive almost twice the area bestowed to daughters (0.42 hectares, 
compared to 0.22 hectares). The value of land inherited is also higher for 
16Seventy-five percent of fathers and twenty-five percent of mothers had 
individual rights to owned land. In many cases, howeveer, owned land was in the 
respective., parents'. provinces of origin and not. in, the ,survey area. 
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sons than for daughters. 17 Sons also receive a higher value of nonland assets 
and of inherited assets. 18 
Means and standard deviations ·of the variables used in the ,regressions 
are presented in Table 2. ,.For the levels estimates;·. estimation was· performed 
on a smaller sample of 2212 individuals belonging to families with at least 
two children, of which 1366 belonged to families which had bestowed land to at 
17Land values for different tenure categories were computed using 1989 
prices. Prices of owned land are readily available. Prices for other tenure 
categories are obtained from informal transactions for usufruct mortgage (land 
pawning) ,> since ·existing land reform laws restrict- the sale and transfer of 
cultivation rights. 
A comprehensive land reform program in rice and corn areas was implemented 
by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, promulgated in 1972. Share tenants 
on land greater than seven hectares in size were allowed to purchase the land 
they cultivated (subject to award limits) through amortization payments based 
on the value of- crop production to .the Land· Bank of the. Philippines. .·$hare 
tenants on ,land less.,than seven hectares in size were converted to fixed-rent 
leaseholders; the rent was based on 25 percent of the output, net of customary 
expenses, as of 1972. Under this program, land rights for the former category 
of tenants were formalized in Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT), which are 
transferable only by hereditary succession or to the government through the 
Department ·of- Agrarian Reform (DAR) ·(Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990)'. 
Leasehold rights, however, can be sold with the approval of the landowner and 
the local DAR office. Despite these laws, there is a growing, albeit illegal, 
market for cultivation rights through land pawning arrangements (Nagarajan, 
Quisumbing and Otsuka 1990). Using pawn-out value as an indicator of the 
implicit market price of a tenancy right, we found that in the Central Luzon 
villages in 1989, the price of a share tenancy right was, on the average, 
approximately equal to the pawning price of leasehold land, but the pawning price 
of CLT land was approximately twice that of leasehold land. In the Panay Island 
villages, which have a mix of tenant and owner-cultivators, the price of title 
sale is from two to five times the pawning price. 
18Nonland assets are valued in 1989 prices. For assets whose present values 
were declared by the respondent, these present values were used. Asset values 
for which only values at bestowal were available were inflated to 1989 values 
using the farm gate rice price index for farm animals, farm assets, on- farm 
residential house and lot, or a region-specific consumer price index (CPI) for 
readily tradeable consumer durables. Since mobility and fungibility of farm 
· assets is limited, and ·the value of farm property linked to returns to rice 
production, the rice price index is thought to be a better adjustment factor than 
the CPI. 
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.least one child. Families with less than two children were excluded since the 
eldest and youngest dummies would not apply. For the fixed effects estimates, 
single""gender families were excluded; this reduced the sample size to 2083 
individuals. 
3.2 Estimation 
Ordinary least squares estimates for the fertility'equation.are· 
presented in Table 3. Completed (surviving) family size, defined as number of 
children ever born minus child deaths below age five, is regressed on mother's 
birth year, father's and mother's education, father's and mother's land 
·,,s: own:ed,<'and•joitrt··"l:andholding at the time of marriage. A female respondent 
dummy.was included to control for differential recall by gender of respondent. 
The results of the fertility equation are disappointing: none of the 
·coefficients are statistically:.csignificant at the :5% level, and the overall 
regression is statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Only the 
coefficients for mother's birth year and education are significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level, with the latter being negative. We are therefore 
led to conclude that, for this generation, fertility behavior is random. 19 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of children's educational levels, 
stratified according to the family's land inheritance status, i.e., whether or 
not parents bestowed land to at least one child, which is taken as exogenous 
in this study. 2° Children's years of schooling is regressed on parental 
19To some extent, this could be due to respondents' difficulty in recalling 
earlier births and parental characteristics. Preliminary results indicate that 
fertility behavior of the next generation is highly responsive to the same 
economic variables. 
20Parents' probability of bestowing land is strongly affected by exogenous 
variables which·are given at the time of marriage. Father's and mother's land 
owned (or landholding at marriage, in an alternative specification) are 
statistically significant in a probit .regression of.. the probability that parents 
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characteristics (father's and mother.' s education and landownership), child ., " 
characteristics (gender, birth year, and dummies for the eldest and youngest 
child), interaction between child gender and birth order terms, and 
' 'Interaction, terms,. for ,child ·gender···and' parental endowments. 21 · 'To' control···for 
differential recall by respondents of their own schooling and transfer levels 
··. relative to their. siblings, a respondent dummy is included; differential 
recall by female respondents is controlled for through a female respondent 
dummy. 22 
For the entire sample, including the full range of interactions, the 
coefficient o'f ·~hild' s ·birth year is positive and significant while the 
·,quadratic .in.bir.th year .(divided by 1000), is significant and negative, ., 
indicating secular increases in schooling at a diminishing rate. The youngest 
child is weakly favored in -terms ,.of,,.education. ·Both father's and mother's 
education and mother's land owned are positively and significantly associated 
with child.schooling. However, likelihood ratio tests for the joint 
significance of gender interactions lead us to accept the null hypothesis that 
gender-birth-order interactions are insignificant, and that all gender 
interactions (with birth order and parent endowments) are equal to zero. We 
bestow land to at least one child (Table A.4, in the Appendix). Although it is 
conceivable that parents may accumulate land in the hope of making bequests to 
their children, this is constrained by land reform laws. Share tenants were 
allowed to receive a maximum of three hectares of irrigated land or five hectares 
of unirrigated land. There is, however, no constraint to the purchase of owned 
land. 
21So that the eldest and youngest dummies would be relevant, families with 
less than two children were excluded. This reduced the number of individuals 
in the sample from 2241 to 2212, and the number of families from 331 to 307. 
22This is an effort to account for respondent-related measurement errors. 
An attempt was made to interact child gender with the gender of the respondent, 
but this. led to multicollinearity ..among regressors. 
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do reject the null hypothesis that gender-parental interaction effects are 
equal to zero ( x2 = 21. 76). There is some weak evidence (at 10%) that 
better educated fathers tend to favor·sons, while land-owning mothers favor· 
daughters .:<-We'weakl-y ,rej ect·the,nulb0hypothesis-ithat··gender 'interactions 0 with 
parents' education are equal (F=2.77), that interactions between gender and 
landownership equal (F=2.55), and that parental interaction effects a 
equal (F=3.10). The respondent dummy is insignificant but the female 
respondent dummy is significant and positive. 
The effects of different resource availabilities can be discerned by 
coinpatirig ''families with·,land bequests, which presumably have more resources, 
to ;families which.are•unable to make land bequests.· While the birth year 
coefficient is significant and positive, and the quadratic term significantly 
.· negative, for both -subsamples,, there: is '.weak. evidence· that daughters receive •.c:, 
less education in the sample with land bequests. This result is somewhat 
modified by the positive (though weakly significant at.10%) coefficient of 
the female-birth year interaction, which may indicate better education for 
later-born females. However, these results should be taken with caution since 
for both types of families, we accept the null hypotheses that (1) gender­
birth order interactions are equal to zero, and (2) that all gender 
interactions are equal to zero. The coefficients of father's and mother's 
education are significant and positive for the sample with land bequests, 
while that of father's land owned is significant and positive for both 
subsamples. It is interesting to note that area cultivated at marriage exerts 
a negative though weak effect on schooling levels, which could reflect higher 
opportunity costs of schooling due to the demand for on-farm family labor. 
This is consistent with evidence from India (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977) 
27 
.which suggests a negative relationship between size of landholding and child 
schooling. There is weak evidence that daughters of better.educated mothers 
receive more schooling in the sample without land bequests; However,,this " 
.\ >;,:" does·· not> necessarily?·ref-lect·,only,;;;parental:Jgender.,preference:,:;:i:butiimartindic-at:e 
technological differences in the household division of labor since mothers' 
· occupations. may benefit from better trained daughters. 23 We reject the null· 
hypothesis that gender-parental interaction terms are equal to zero only for 
the sample with land bequests. For the entire sample and the subsample 
without land bequests, we reject the null hypothesis that gender interactio 
.,,effects with parents ,,·education are equal (F=2. 77; F= -2 .10), and for the 
• -entire,·,sample :we..reject the. equality· of parental landownership interaction---·""' 
terms (F=2.55) and of-both education and landownership interaction terms 
(F=3.10). 
Differences across siblings within the same family are analyzed using 
family fixed effects estimates; with a.complete set of gender interactions· 
(Table >5) . 24 · For the entire sample and the families which make land 
bequests, the dummy.for the eldest child is positive and that for the youngest 
negative. These coefficients are weakly different from each other; F­
statistics are 2.82 and 4.96, for the two sample categories, respectively. In 
the sample without land bestowal, later-born female children are favored with 
23Anthropological evidence also suggests that daughters not only act as 
mother-surrogates if the latter is absent or feeble, but have strong 
responsibilities toward their mothers. A daughter has an obligation to provide 
moral and financial support for her mother, and even when married, a daughter 
commonly attends to her mother's needs first (Nurge 1965: 102; quoted in Lopez 
1991: 18). 
24Single-gender families and families with less than two children were 
excluded. Tbe. sample size for the .fixed effects estimation .is 2083. 
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.respect to education, although if the youngest is female, she appears to 
receive less education than ·her siblings.·· ,The strongest and most consistent> 
effects, however,- are for· birth year·. differences. Later born children receive 
-. :better :•than·average.·.education··within .the, ..fami1y. ':,Respondents~~owho.care,cchy:;,y.;<'i'.' 
sample design, usually involved in agricultural production, have significantly 
lower levels of education than the sibling average. The above .results must.be 
qualified, however, since tests for the joint significance of gender 
interaction terms lead to the acceptance of the null hypotheses that (1) 
gender-birth order effects are insignificant (except for the sample without 
' land 'bestowa'l") 0 ;,:··( 2} ,gender-parental interaction terms are equal to zero; and 
(3) alLgender,.interactions .are .equaLto zero ... In:the ...whole, sample and ..,the....,~. 
sample with land bestowal, we reject the null hypothesis for equality of 
eldest and youngest'children ,,in -education (F=2. 82 and F=4. 96, respectively); 
for the latter subsample, we weakly reject the equality of gender-birth order 
interaction terms (F=2.58). 
Having rejected the joint significance of the gender interaction terms, 
we reestimate the model as a function purely of child characteristics and 
parent endowments (Table 6). In level terms, daughters are clearly favored 
with respect to education. Educational levels increase secularly at a 
diminishing rate, and there is weak evidence to support that the youngest 
child may receive more education, a reversal of the results mentioned above. 
Both parents' levels of schooling exert positive and significant effects, and 
mother's education has a stronger effect on child's education, regardless of 
the gender of the child. We reject the null hypotheses that parents' 
education effects are equal (F= 2.94 for the whole sample; F= 2.49 for the 
sample without land bestowal). Education is also positively related to 
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,parents' landownership, although both effects are statistically equal. In the 
sample without landbestowal,:-·area cultivated exerts a negative influence-on< 
children's education, possibly due to competing demands for children's•· time. 
When'we take' into account family fixed effects 'without. the :gender."intera:ction 
terms (Table 7), the two variables which remain significant are the birth year 
difference (positive) .and the respondent dummy (negative), ,The. female.dummy 
is insignificant. 
We examine determinants of the levels of land and nonla:nd asset 
transfers in families which make land transfers to at least one heir, with all 
;,_:igender<interac1ti'ons· included (Table 8). None of the child characteristics, 
. 
except _.for. the positive and significant eldest .. female dummy, ,,,is a significant-
determinant of the value of land received by heirs. In contrast, some 
parental chatacte:fistics ~a.riff most -ofc:the gender;;parent endowment int:etacfion 
terms significantly affect land bestowal levels. Mother's education has a. 
significant and negative effect on land bestowals, while area cultivated at 
·marriage has a significantly positive effect. The latter probably indicates a 
larger area of land to divide among children and would thus be positively 
associated with land transfer levels. Differential effects of parental 
endowments by child gender are more obvious from examination of the 
interaction terms. Better educated fathers tend to give land to boys, while 
better educated mothers favor girls. Land-owning fathers and mothers tend to 
give land to girls. Families with larger cultivated areas, however, tend to 
give land to sons. This supports anthropological evidence (Takahashi 1969; 
Umehara 1974) that among land-owning families, both sons and daughters inherit 
land, while among tenant families (who do not own land but cultivate rented 
land) tenancy rights are bestowed to male heirs. We reject the equality of 
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(1) parents' education effects, (2) parents' landownership effects, and (3) 
both education and landownership effects ....Moreover, we reject the .equality of 
gender-parental education effects and the equality of both sets of parental 
interaction terms. 
Younger children tend to get lower levels of nonland asset transfers, 
although if the youngest child is female, she receives higher levels of 
nonland assets. This may be due to the cultural expectation for the youngest 
child, especially if she is a daughter, to care for the parents in their old 
age. The youngest child usually receives the parental home as a bequest. 
, Mother'•s.··education'and-·father's and mother's owned land have negative 
coefficients, but area cultivated is a significant and .positive .determinant o.f 
nonland asset transfers. Better educated fathers and land-owning fathers tend 
0.to give nonland assets to•daughters although families who cultivate larger 
areas may give nonland assets to sons, possibly because of complementarity 
between farm assets and land bestowed . 
.. Levels of total .inheritance appear to be .weakly higher for daughters .but 
lower for younger children. Later-born daughters, however, appear to receive 
lower values of total inheritance. Mother's education is negatively related 
to total value of inheritance, but larger areas cultivated positively affect 
the total value of inheritance a child can receive. Sons of better educated 
fathers and daughters of better educated mothers receive larger total 
bestowals. Land-owning fathers and mothers bestow higher values of inherited 
wealth to daughters, though the latter are at a disadvantage in families which 
cultivate large areas. The respondent dummy is significant and positive in 
all equations. 
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In contrast to the education equations, we reject the null hypotheses 
that the gender interactions are .jointly,Sequal ·to zero. In all· three. 
equations, we reject the null hypotheses that (1) gender-parental interaction 
-effects are equal to zero; .and (2). that alL gender,. interaction:;, effe·ct.s:. are:., •,< 
equal to zero. However, we can reject the hypothesis that gender-birth order 
effects are equal to zero only in the land value equation. In .the other .. 
equations, we accept the null hypotheses that these effects are equal to zero­
-birth order interactions do not seem to be important determinants of nonland 
assets and total value of inheritance. We also reject the hypotheses that (1) 
·,: ·"parent~t••te'ducf:rti:on'•-effects are equal in all equations; (2) parents' 
· .. landownership ..effects are equal in the land and. total inheritance equations; "' 
(3) parental effects are jointly equal in the land and total inheritance 
equations; (4) parental education interactions are equal; and (5) both types 
of parental interaction terms are equal. Parental landownership interactions 
with gender are equal, lending support to anthropological findings on transfer 
behavior by landowning families. 
When we account for family fixed effects (Table 9), the bias against 
daughters in land inheritance becomes evident. While other child 
characteristics are insignificant, the female dummy is significant and 
negative. Daughters of better educated mothers, however, tend to receive more 
land. Daughters and later-born children also receive more nonland assets, 
although the youngest child is not especially favored, unless it is a 
daughter. Surprisingly, the coefficients for later born daughters and eldest 
female children are negative. Daughters in families cultivating larger areas 
tend to receive less nonland assets compared to the sibling average. 
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The bias against females persists when we examine differences in total 
inheritance value. ·Females, especially younger females, receive less 
inheritance than their siblings. Better educated fathers favor sons, while 
· -- ii<- landowning ,,mothers- .favor: daughters; ·. The:'respondent,dummy ,is 0-,significant -'and\:· 
positive, which may indicate either that the respondent has received more 
relative to his siblings, or that respondent recall.for his own receipts is 
more accurate. In contrast to the level estimates, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that gender-birth order effects are equal to zero only in the 
nonland asset equation, and that all gender interactions are equal to zero in 
the>same•e·quati:on;··• ·We reject the null hypotheses that eldest daughters and 
·,,:•,~·-:Younges.t.,daughters .. are ..,treated. equally in.,nonland .. asset bequests .. We also ... ,.:,, 
reject the hypotheses that (1) child gender interaction terms with parents' 
education are equal;·;and (2) both,child gender-parental interaction effects 
are equal. 
Since gender-interaction effects are significant in the levels 
equations, we- do not reestimate these, without the,. interactions. We present ,;cc. 
the results of the family fixed effects estimates without the gender 
interactions in Table 10. Relative to sibling means, female children receive 
significantly less in terms of land value. The eldest child also receives 
more than the average, although this coefficient is not significantly 
different from that for the youngest child. Nonland asset bestowal seems to­
be neutral with respect to gender, although the eldest child does not appear 
to be favored. Finally, daughters receive less total inheritance relative to 
sibling averages. The respondent dummy is significant and positive in all 
equations, and there is no significant difference between eldest and youngest 
children in any of the equations. 
33 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Intergenerational wealth transfers by households in rice-growing 
,, ·:villages·· were modeled "as.· the: outcome ,,of:. bargaining··,betweem,parents:.··~·,,Empirical. 
results support previous findings that differences in parents' bargaining 
positions--indicated by education and landownership--have .significant· 
consequences on intergenerational transfers to children. Coefficients of 
father's and mother's education are significantly different from each other in 
the education, land, and nonland asset transfer equations, while coefficients 
of father:' s and :mother's landownership are significantly different from each 
other.in land and.total .inheritance equations. 
We summarize our findings by focusing on two dimensions of 
intrahousehold differences in wealth transfers: (1) differences between sons 
and daughters; and (2) interactions between parental characteristics and child 
gender. Our findings are remarkably consistent with the anthropological 
• literature and field studies on inheritance in the lowland· Philippines · ,, 
(Anderson 1962; Scheans 1965; Takahashi 1969; Umehara 1974; Lewis 1971). 
Despite Philippine laws which stipulate equal inheritance by sex, there 
are marked differences in transfers towards sons and daughters. In absolute 
(level) terms, daughters receive more education and total inheritance but less 
land. In terms of deviations from the sibling mean, however, education is 
neutral with respect to gender, nonland asset transfers weakly favor 
daughters, while sons get more land and higher values of total inheritance. 
The preference for sons in land bestowal can be attributed to the custom of 
giving a portion of the parents' holdings to their son, or sons, when they got 
married (Umehara 1974). The Ilocanos, who account for a majority of 
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respondents in the Central Luzon villages, subscribe to the custom of the male 
land dowry (sabong) whereby parents bestow land (or a tenancy right) to the , 
son upon marriage, with the understanding that he will take care of his 
p·arents in their old age. •· Land ,bestowals ·~are-' almost··exclusive:Ly··to ''sons :in""'."'' 
Ilocano tenant families, though males and females usually inherit equal .shares 
in landowning- families (Takahashi 1969; ., Umehara· 1974) . 25 Land bestowals to ->.; 
son may reflect higher returns to specific experience for boys (Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin 1985), since rice farming is more intensive in male labor. 
To highlight the differential effects of parent endowments and birth 
order by child gender, we summarize the gender interaction terms in Table 11. 
~-,,"In, generaL,,. gender-,interactions with' birth, order·- are ~insignificant:; .·, except in• 
land bestowal, where the eldest daughter may receive a higher level of land 
transfers. Gender- interactions are relatively unimportant determinants of 
educational levels, although they are significant in bestowals of nonhuman 
capital. In most cases, child gender interacts significantly with parent 
- ··endowments. · These interactions· are most obvious in' the equations for nonhuman 
,.. capital .transfers; where daughters of better educated mothers, land-owning 
fathers, and land-owning mothers receive higher levels of land and nonland 
assets. On the other hand, better educated fathers and families with larger 
25There is actually wide variation in land inheritance practices among 
lowland Filipinos. In our Panay Island villages, for example, daughters also 
inherit tenancy rights, as documented in Ledesma (1982). Even among the 
Ilocanos, both primogeniture and ultimogeniture have been observed. It has been 
suggested that the availability of land determines the actual practice in a 
community. In areas like Ilocos Norte where land pressures are extreme, parents 
postpone giving land to the older son at marriage, and use the land to finance 
him and others to migrate abroad. This leaves the land in the hands of the 
youngest son. In areas· like Isabela where frontier areas are available, the 
oldest gets the largest share of land, encouraging younger sons to open up new 
farmlands from surrounding forests (Lews 1971: 92). 
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,areas cultivated tend to bestow preferentially to sons. The finding that 
gender interactions are relatively unimportant in educational choices, and 
that females receive more education, suggests that educational investment in 
girls may serve to offset the bias against·daughters in land and total 
inheritance. 
Trend analysis of levels of transfers also indicates that education may 
become more prevalent as a means for intergenerational transfers by rural 
households. Figures 2 and 3 present predicted values of education and 
nonhuman capital transfers, respectively, evaluated at the means of the 
.. ;.indepEihderit''Vari'ables·r ·with varying birth year. 26 Educational levels rise 
..through time, ,.hut levels. of. land and. nonland asset .transfers. per child 
decline. This reflects not only secular improvements in the school system, 
particularly in the postwar era,·but, more·importantly, the increased 
desirability of education as nonagricultural employment opportunities expanded 
and population pressure on limited ,land led to diminishing farm sizes. 27 ·. The, 
.increased attractiveness of nonagricultural. occupations and.more binding land 
constraints led to a revision of parents' choices of transfers to children. 
26Education levels were predicted without gender interactions terms using 
the coefficients in Table 6; land, asset, and total inheritance were predicted 
using the tobit estimates with interaction terms (Table 8). 
27After the 1950s, the appearance of import-substituting manufacturing 
industries, mostly near Manila, was accompanied by the urbanization of the 
population and a shift of the labor force from agriculture. Although labor 
absorption in industry was constrained by relatively capital-intensive 
technology, the urban sector continued to attract migrants, many of whom were 
absorbed in the services sector. At the same time, the exhaustion of frontier 
land in the late 1950s and the acceleration of population growth after World War 
II ended the traditional pattern of agricultural growth based on expansion of 
·cultivated area. ,,.Instead;, subsequent increases in growth were due to increases 
in productivity attributed to multiple cropping and the adoption of the modern 
seed~fertilizer technology (International Labor Office, 1974). 
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Thus, after the 1950s, the cost of an education for a nonagricultural (usually 
civil service) position became the substitute for a farm, and in the 
calculation of property division for inheritance and in arranged marriage 
/:-:-, ·.· ,,negotiations, the.extent to which .,a•child•, orc,suitor' s '·-life-,c],1-an:ces:1:had,::beew.:;,;,,, 
provided for by expenditure on education became a valid consideration-(Fegan 
1982:119). 
These inheritance rules observed in rice farming communities have 
implications on intrafamily and intergenerational inequality. In terms of 
household formation and bargaining power within marriage, within agricultural 
·:\communities\·'the•'•bias~•'against women in land inheritance would create a 
,disadvantage ,in ,terms .of .asset -.position, .unless this,, is .compensated,by, higher;" 
human capital investment. 
While our results suggest that daughters receive more education while 
sons get more land, .tests -of parental preferences for equal concern should 
involve comparable units .of measurement;. For human capital to be regarded on 
a par with land and other assets; estimates ,,of the• discounted value .-of, returns 
to education must be made and risk assessment performed. This would require 
the estimation of wage and earnings functions for men and women in both 
agricultural and nonagricultural occupations from other data sources. 
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APPENDIX 
This data appendix provides a more detailed description of the study 
·•. villages, and is taken fromNagarajan,•·Quisumbing·and·Otsuka···(l990)'.n•.,"'·.';•.'''· 
Two villages are located in Central Luzon, whereas three villages are.in 
Panay Island (see Fig. 1). In the· _Central .Luzon villages, large ·rice ,hacien­
das of more than a hundred hectares existed before the 1972 land reform. On 
the other hand, in the three villages in Panay Island, called Pl, P2, and P3, 
landlords are only small to medium landowners. 
-< · -Thes'e 0 five,·vil1ages are typical rice growing villages in Central Luzon 
and Panay Island, respectively, and the whole area is planted to rice during 
the wet season (June to December). Table A.1 shows the number of sample 
farmers, average farm size, and technology characteristics in rice farming by 
village in 1985. The average farm size was substantially larger in the 
Central Luzon villages than in the Panay Island villages. CLl and Pl are 
fully irrigated by well-maintained.gravity irrigation systems, whereas·CL2 and 
P2 are characterized by shallow, favorable rainfed conditions commonly found 
in the country. P3 is also rainfed but is located in the most unfavorable 
mountainous environment, which is prone to drought. Modern rice varieties 
(MVs) were fully adopted in CLl, CL2 and Pl, whereas traditional varieties 
(TVs) were planted in the hilly part of P2 and the mountainous part of P3 
during the wet season. 28 In the irrigated villages, more than two rice crops 
were grown. Double cropping of rice was practiced by several farmers in CL2 
using irrigation pumps. With shorter growth duration of MVs and more even 
28According to a recent study of MV adoption in the Philippines by David and 
Otsuka (1990), MVs have been almost fully adopted both in irrigated and shallow 
rainfed areas. 
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rainfall patterns in Panay Island, two crops of rice were grown under rainfed 
conditions in some parts of· P2 and P3. Because of non-photo sensitivity of 
MVs, all rice varieties grown as second and third crops were MVs. Reflecting 
.the differential adoption of- MVs and different 'production senvironments, <cs7::, : •. ,-' '·? · 
average yield per hectare.was significantly higher in the irrigated than in 
rainfed villages, particularly the most unfavorable village P3. 
Before the land reform program initiated in 1972, most farmers were 
share tenants in the Central Luzon villages, whereas both share tenants and 
owner-cultivators coexisted in the Panay Island villages. Table A.2 shows the 
to a relatively thorough implementation,of land reform, share tenancy had 
almost disappeared in CLl and CL2. Share tenancy persisted in Pl and P2, even 
though many share tenants had been-converted to leaseholders. In contrast, 
share tenancy was still very common in P3, where practically no land reform 
was implemented. An important finding from Table A.2 is that areas under 
paWI)ing contract ..(usufruct mortgage) ..increased considerably from 1985 to, 198-9,, 
particularly in CLl and CL2. Correspondingly, areas under leasehold and CLT 
decreased in these two villages. In the Panay Island villages, pawning was 
much less common. However, area under the illegal practice of share tenancy 
increased in P2 and area under leasehold increased in P3. 29 
Table A.3 indicates the distribution of area cultivated by mode of 
acquisition. Inheritance and tenancy agreements negotiated directly with 
landowners (not subtenancy arrangements) are the two major ways by which 
29Note that our tenure classification--in Table A. 2 is based on tenure status 
of cultivators, so that sub-leaseholders and sub-share tenants were included in 
leasehold/CLT and share tenancy categories, respectively. 
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households have acquired land rights. Inheritance is the dominant mode of 
land right acquisition in Pl, with 49% of area cultivated by respondents being 
inherited. Inheritance is also the major mode of land acquisition in CLl, 
with land, rights to 38% of• the area. havi-ng been 'inherited.· :In ·the,vil1ages 0 of 
P2 and P3, rights to most of the area cultivated were acquired through tenancy 
arrangements,with ·landowners, while roughly equal percentages of land cul­
tivated (37%) were acquired through either inheritance or tenancy agreements 
in CL2. In general, average area of land transacted is higher in the Central 
Luzon villages. Furthermore, in all villages except P2, rights to the major 
-·· "'Portion •b'f 'a:tea: ~cu'ltivated were inherited through the husband. 
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TABLE 1. Parental characteristics, child schooling and inheritance, 
by father's tenure status 





laborer wage earner Tenant Owner Total 
No. of parents (couples) 
No. of sons 
No. of daughters 
Sex ratio (sons/daughters) 
Completed family sizea 































·. J< ;\Landholding:,,at:s:marr:i:age· '•(ha) 
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Mother's land owned 



































































Value of inheritance (in thousand 


































..,Change in male education (C-A) · 2;56 2 .45 . 2.79 3.06 2.85 
Change in female education (D-B) 2.64 3.19 3.70 4.13 3.85 
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TABLE 1, continued 
Notes: 
aNumber of children ever born minus child deaths below age 5. 
· • ... ,.·,bSize of.;cland,cultivated by -the> household,, 'regardless '•of :;:tenure,,status-:' 0 '''".,''!''f.'. 
cAgricultural land. 
dincludes residential house and lot. 
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TABLE 2. Means and standard deviations of selected variables 
Variable 
Full sample 
No. of families: 331 
No. of individuals: 2241 
Completed family size (number of children 
ever born minus child deaths below age five) 
Sub-sample 
No. of families with 2 or more children: 307 
No. of individuals with complete information: 
<-Indivi'duals in· families with land bestowal: 
2212 
1366 
Individuals in families without land bestowal: 846 
Completed family size in subsample 
Parental characteristics 
Education (years of schooling) 
Father 
Mother 
Size of land owned (ha) 
Father 
Mother 
Area cultivated at marriage (ha) 
Child characteristics 
Families with land bestowal: (1366 individuals) 
·. Education (years of schooling) 
Value of land inherited (in thousand 1989 pesos) 
Value of nonland assets inherited (in thousand 
1989 pesos) 
Total value of inheritance (in thousand 1989 pesos) 
Families without land bestowal: (846 individuals) 





























TABLE 3. Fertility equation, OLS estimates 
Dependent variable: Completed family size8 
(1) (2) 
Intercept -24.89 -17.10 
(-1. 31) (-1. 01) 
Mother's birth year .02* .01 
(1. 67) (1.41) 
Years of schooling 
Father .06 
(1.02) 
Mother - .11* 
(-1.63) 
Size of land owned 
Father - . 06 - . 06 
( - . 97) ( - 1. 01) 
Mother - .04 - .06 
(. 46) (-.66) 
Area cultivated (ha) .07 .07 
(1.42) (1.43) 
Female respondent dummy -.65 -.61 
(-1.46) (-1. 36) 
Adjusted R2 .01 .01 
F-statistic 1.40 1.42 
Number of observationsb 321 321 
8 Number of children ever born minus child deaths below age five. 
bNumber of observations with complete information on parent and family 
characteristics. 
*Significant at a .10. 
48 






(Birth year/1000) squared 
Eldest dummy 
Youngest dummy 
Gender x birth order interaction 
Female x birth year 
Female x eldest dummy 
Female x youngest dummy 
Parent endowments 
Education (years of schooling) 
Father 
Mother 
Size of land owned (ha) 
Father 
Mother 
Area cultivated (ha) at marriage 
Dependent variable: Levels 
of Child's years of schooling 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample bestowal bestowal 
-3197 .11***- 5812. 91***-2102. ss*** 
(-3.86) (-3.53) (-2.16) 
-19.69 29.28 -49.33* 
(-.94) (.82) (-1.88) 
3 . 2 3 *** 5 . 91*** 2 . 11** 
(3.78) (3.48) (2.10) 
-814.300***-1498.46*** -528.65** 
(3.69) (-3.43) (-2.04) 
.21 .so .09 
(.80) (1.14) (.27) 
.49* .52 .46 
(1.78) (1.20) (1.31) 
.01 - . 01 .03* 
(.95) ( - . 80) (1.88) 
- .OS -.30 .OS 
( - .11) (-.43) (.09) 
-.39 -.70 -.14 
( - . 97) (1.03) (-.28) 
.11*** .08 .13*** 
(2.94) (1. 09) (3.00) 
.12*** .09 .16*** 
(2.58) (1.14) (2.78) 
.09** . 21** .08* 
(2.27) (1. 90) ( 1. 68) 
.06 .18 .OS 
(1.14) (.79) (.98) 
- .04 - .14 - . 06* 
(-1.32) (-1. 30) ( -1. 58) 
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TABLE 4, continued 
Dependent variable: Levels, 
Child's years of schooling 
Gender X parent endowment interaction 
Female x father's education 
Female x mother's education 
Female x father's land owned 
Female x mother's land owned 
Female x area cultivated 
Respondent controls 
Respondent dummy 
Female respondent dummy 
F-tests on coefficients 
Eldest= Youngest 
Gender-birth order effects equal 
Parents' education effects equal 
Parents' landownership effects equal 
· · 'Parents' effects· jointly equal 
Gender-parents' education effects equal 
Gender-parents' landownership effects equal 
Parental interaction effects jointly equal 
Tests for joint significance of gender 
interactions (x2 statistics) 
Gender-birth order effects= 0 
Gender-parental interaction effects 0 
All gender interactions= 0 
Whole 
sample 
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TABLE 4, continued 
Dependent variable: Levels, 
Child's years of schooling 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample bestowal bestowal 
Adjusted R2 .19 .20 .20 
F-statistic 27. 56*** 11. 57*** 17. 79,,,,,,,,, 
Mean of dependent variable 6.76 6.64 6.83 
No. of observations 2212 846 1366 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** . . f"s1gn1 icant at a=. 01 
**significant at a= .05 
"'significant at a= .10 
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TABLE 5. Education of children, by family land inheritance status, 
family fixed effectsa 
Child characteristics 
Female dummy 
Birth year difference 
Eldest dummy 
Youngest dummy 
Gender-birth order interaction 
Female x birth year difference 
Female x eldest dummy 
Female x youngest dummy 
Gender-parent endowment interaction 
Female x father's education 
Female x mother's education 
Female x father's land owned 
Female x mother's land owned 
Female x area cultivated 
Respondent control 
Respondent dummy 
F-tests on coefficients 
Eldest= youngest 
Gender-birth order effects equal 
·· ·Gender-parents' education effects equal 
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TABLE 5, continued 
Dependent variable: 
First differences Eij - Ej 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample bestowal bestowal 
Parental interaction effects Jointly equal 0.03 0.23 0.00 
Tests for joint significance of gender 
interaction (x2 statistics) 
Gender-birth order effects= 0 2.96 7.24* 3.40 
Gender-parental interaction effects 0 6.78 2.00 0.44 
All gender interactions= 0 3.74 9.28 3.88 
Adjusted R2 .04 .04 .OS 
F-statistic 9. 1s*** 3. 74*** 6. 33*** 
No. of observations 2083 786 1297 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** · ·f· 01signi icant at a=. 
** . ·f· 05signi icant at a=. 
*significant at a= .10 
aEstimated for.nonsingle-sex families with at least two children. 
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TABLE 6. Educational levels of children, by family land inheritance status, 









Education (years of schooling) 
Father 
Mother 
Size of land owned (ha) 
Father 
Mother 
Area cultivated at marriage (ha) 
Respondent control 
Respondent dummy 
Female respondent dummy 
estimates 
Dependent variable: Levels, 
Child's years of schooling 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample bestowal bestowal 
-3265. 22***-6056. 23*** -2111. 61** 
(-3.95) (-3.70) (-2.18) 
.34** .36 .32* 
(2.36) (1.49) (1.78) 
3.30*** 6.16*** 2.11** 
(3.86) (3.66) (2.11) 
-830. 36*** -1567. 04*** - 525. 49** 
(-3.77) (-3.61) (-2.03) 
.19 .37 .08 
(.92) (1.09) (.32) 
.34* .17 .42* 
(1.70) (.51) (1.68) 
.06** .03 . 09*** 
(2.30) (0.55) (2.75) 
. 15*** .18*** .14*** 
(4.62) (3.26) (3.38) 
. 10*** . 26*** . 10*** 
(3.19) (3.04) (2.76) 
. 10** .20 . 09** 
(2.39) (1.12) (2.03) 
- .03 - . 22*** - .03 
(-1.28) (-2.64) (-.90) 
-.25 - . 58* - .08 
(-1.25) (-1.71) (-.31) 
. 74*** 1. 77*** .36 
(3.17) (4.21) (1. 27) 
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TABLE 6, continued 
F-tests on coefficients 
Eldest= youngest 
Parents' education effects equal 
Parents' landownership effects equal 
Adjusted R2 
F-statistic 
Mean of dependent variable 
No. of observations 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
***.signi"f"icant at a=. 01 
**significant at a= .05 
*significant at a= .10 
Dependent variable: Levels, 
Child's year of schooling 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample bestowal bestowal 
.32 .21 1.03 
2. 94* 2 .49* .74 
.01 .10 .02 
.19 .20 .19 
44. 96*** 18. 81*** 28. 27*** 
6.76 6.64 6.83 
2212 846 1366 
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TABLE 7. Education of children, by family land inheritance status, 
without gender interactions,family fixed effectsa 
Female dummy 








No. of observations 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** · 01s1.gn1."f"1.cant at a:==. 
**significant at a:= .05 
*significant at a:= .10 
Dependent variable: 
First differences Eij - Ej 
Sample Sample 
without with 
Whole land land 
sample .bestowal bestowal 
9. 70xl0-3 .08 - . 06 
(-.10) (.55) (-.48) 
. 12*** . 09*** .13*** 
(8.65) (4.37) (7. 35) 
.31 .33 .29 
(1.55) (1.12) (1.07) 
-.24 - . 06 -.34 
(-1.21) (-.22) (-1. 24) 
. 51 *** - . 69*** - .40* 
(-3.03) (-2.87) (-1.78) 
3.19* .74 2.26 
.05 .04 .05 
26. 58*** 8. 91*** 18.08 
2083 786 1297 
aEstimated for nonsingle-sex families with at least two children. 
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TABLE 8. Levels of children's land and nonland asset inheritance, 
families with positive land bestowals, tobit estimates 
Dependent variables: Levels 
Nonland Total 
Land asset inheritance 
value value value 
Lij Aij Tij 
Intercept 879.99 1312. 67 1389. 91** 
(1.49) (1.49) (2.02) 
Child characteristics 
Female dummy 1370. 63 2071.63 1771. 36* 
(1. 45) (1.45) (1.66) 
Birth year - .48 - . 74* - . 73** 
( -1. 54) (-1.62) (-2.06) 
Eldest dummy 10.30 -10.88 6.24 
(. 91) (-.68) (. 49) 
Youngest dummy 11.07 -13.21 12.23 
(.95) ( - . 71) (.92) 
Gender-birth year interaction 
Female x birth year -.73 -1.08 - . 93* 
(-1.49) ( -1. 46) (-1.69) 
Female x eldest dummy 32. 38* -15.98 27.35 
(1.83) (-.55) ( 1. 35) 
Female x youngest dummy 8.96 47. 99* 14.36 
(.50) (1. 78) (. 72) 
Parent endowments 
Education (years of schooling) 
Father 1.44 1.96 1. 27 
(1.01) (.94) (. 77) 
Mother -4. 59** -6. 34** -5.27** 
(-2.34) (-2.17) (-2.34) 
Size of land owned (ha) 
Father 2.21 -7 .09*** 2.60 
(1. 48) (-3.26) (1. 52) 
Mother -2. 71 -5. 10** -3.31 
(-1.49) (-2.10) (-1.59) 
Area cultivated (ha) 5. 61*** 9 .11*** 6. 52*** 
(4.67) (5.59) (4.74) 
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,TABLE 8 , continued 
Gender-parent characteristic interaction 
Female x father's education 
Female x mother's education 
Female x father's land owned 
Female x mother's land owned 
Female x area cultivated 
Respondent controls 
Respondent dummy 
Female respondent dummy 
Sigma 
Tests on coefficients (x2 statistics)a 
Eldest= youngest 
Gender-brith order effects equal 
Parents~ education .. effects equal 
Parents' landownership effects equal 
Parental effects jointly equal 
Gender-parents' education effects equal 
Gender-parents' landownership 
effects equal 
Parental interaction effects 
jointly equal 
Tests for joint significance of gender 
interactions (x2 statistics)b 
Gender-birth order effects= 0 
Gender-parental interaction effects 0 

































































































TABLE 8, continued 
Log-likelihood 
Mean of dependent variable 
No. of nonlimit observations 
No. of observations 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
-·.signi"f"icant at a=. 01 
**significant at a= .05 





















TABLE 9. Land and nonland asset inheritance, families with positive 




Land asset inheritance 
value value value 
Lij - Lj Aij - Aj Tij - Tj 
Child characteristics 
Female dummy -11.19*** 2.95 -8. 24* 
(-2.88) (1. 67) (-1. 94) 
Birth year difference -.34 .49*** .15 
(-.86) (2.76) (.36) 
Eldest dummy 8.16 .66 8.82 
(1.42) (.25) (1. 40) 
Youngest dummy .84 -5. 93** -5.08 
(.14) (-2.15) ( - . 77) 
Gender-brith order interaction 
Female x birth year difference .17 -1. 29*** -l.12* 
(.28) (-4.67) (-1.68) 
Female x eldest dummy 4.52 -10. 70*** -6.17 
(.50) (-2.60) ( - . 62) 
Female x youngest dummy 4.66 9. 75** 14.42 
(.51) (2.37) (1. 46) 
Gender-parent endowment interaction 
Female x father's education -1.04 -.20 -1. 24* 
(-1.46) (-.63) (-1.59) 
, ,Female-,x"mother! s education 1.56* -.25 1. 31 
(1.74) (-.62) (1. 34) 
Female x father's land owned -.17 .47 .30 
(-.21) (1. 30) (.35) 
Female x mother's land owned 1.41 .50 1. 90* 
(1. 28) (.99) (1.58) 
Female x area cultivated - .49 - . 54* -1.03 
(.73) (-1.77) (-1.40) 
Respondent control 
Respondent dummy 8. 24** 5. 44*** 13. 69*** 
(2.17) (3.15) (3.30) 
F-tests on coefficients 
Eldest= youngest .63 2.47 1. 90 
Gender-birth order effects equal .00 10. 54*** 1.85 
Gender-parents' education effects equal 3. 35* .00 2. 70* 
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Land asset inheritance 
value value value 
Lij - Lj Aij - Aj Tij - Tj 
Gender-parents' landownership 
effects equal 2.07 .00 1. 79 
Parental interaction effects jointly equal3.14** .00 2.61* 
Tests for joint significance of gender 
interactions (x2 statistics) 
Gender-birth order effects= 0 .78 21. 92*** 3.36 
""e:i :iJ::->,G~riq.eor,... pa!t"enta,l,;c,,intzeraction effects 0 6. 80 5.44 7.44 
All gender interaction effects= 0 8.00 26. 76*** 10.76 
Adjusted R2 .02 .02 .02 
F-statistic 3. 66*** 3. 26*** 4. 82*** 
No. of observations 1297 1297 1297 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** . . f 0 01signi icant at a=. 
**significant at a= .05 
*significant at a= .10 
aThe dependent variable is defined as Yij - Yj where Yij is the inheritance of 
individual i in family j, and Yj is the average across siblings in family j. 
bDefined as individual deviation from the family birth year average Bij - Bj. 
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TABLE 10. Land and nonland asset inheritance, families with positive 
landbestowals, without gender interactions, family fixed effects 
Female dummy 
Birth year difference 
Eldest dummy 
, :Yoµngest ,dummy 
Respondent dummy 




No. of observations 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** . . .c• 01 , '" s1.gn1.J.1.cant ,at. a =. ,. 
**significant at a = . 05 
*significant at a= .10 




Land asset inheritance 
value value value 
Lij - Lj Aij - Aj Tij - Tj 
-10. 78*** .10 -10. 69*** 
(-4.95) ( .10) (-4.49) 
-.25 - .04 -.29 
(-.84) (-.29) (-.88) 
10 .16** -3. 52* 6.64 
(2.29) (-1.73) (1. 37) 
3.42 -1.62 1.80 
(.76) (-.79) (. 37) 
7. 41** 5. 38*** 12. 79*** 
(1. 99) (3.16) (3.14) 
.96 .37 .42 
.05 .01 .02 
18. 03*** 3. 05** 8. 81**** 
1297 1297 1297 
- Yj where Yij is the inheritance of 
individual i in family j, and Yj is the average across siblings in family j. 
bDefined as individual deviation from the family birth year average Bij - Bj. 
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.TABLE 11. Summary of gender interactionsa 
Whole Sample without 
Sample/Levels of transfers sample land bestowal Sample with land bestowal 
Total 
Land asset inheritance 
Education Education Education value Value value 
Gender-brith order interaction 
Female X birth year difference 













Female X youngest dUDJ:DY -.39 -.70 -.14 8.9 47.99" 14.36 
Gender-Earent endowment interaction 
Female X father's education -.10* -.01 -.09 -6.66*** -3.23 -6.88"** 
Female X mother's education 













Female X mother's land owned 













Tests for joint2sisnificance of sender interactions <x statistics) 
Gender-birth order effects 0 1.64 2.10 3.74 1.00* 4.80 6.00 
··_·,,;:Gender-parent-al'' interaction ,..··-
effects= 0 32.76*** 4.56 12.84** 20.60*** 14.oo** 16.20*** 
All genderinteraction effects 0 11.02 6.28 2.12 2a.80*** 20.14*** 25.20*** 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** • • f. 01signi icant at a=. 
""significant at a= .05 
"significant at a .10 
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es = entire sample......0 
2~ wl = with landro 
1 = no land~ 
0 
-2 
i~80 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Birth Year of Child 








10 a = assets
t = total inheritance
5 
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Birth Year of Child 
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TABLE A.l. Average farm size and technology characteristics in rice farming 
by village, 1985. 
Central Luzon Panay Island 
CLl CL2 Pl P2 P3 
No. of sample farmers 85 52 37 65 47 
Average farm size (ha) 2.1 1. 7 1.1 1.4 0.9 
Ratio of irrigated area(%) 100 16 100 0 0 
Adoption rate of MVs (%)a 100 100 100 79 59 
Rice cropping intensity 200 114 243 131 125 
Average rice yield (t/ha)b 4.7 3 .4 3.6 2.9 1. 9 
aFigures refer to wet season only. 
bweighted average of wet and dry season yields, weights being the ratios of 
planted areas. 
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TABLE A.2. Distribution of operational farm areas by tenure and by village, 
1985 and 1989 wet seasons (%) 
Central Luzon Panay Island 
CLl CL2 Pl P2 P3 
Owner cultivator: 
1985 9 18 27 47 33 
1989 7 11 25 48 39 
Leasehold & CLT:a 
1985 80 76 38 32 8 
1989 65 68 31 25 15 
Share tenancy: 
1985 5 0 34 17 58 
1989 2 1 35 22 42 
Pawning: 
1985 6 6 2 5 1 
1989 26 20 9 5 5 
aCLT refers to certificate of land transfer. 
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TABLE A.3. Distribution of area cultivated by mode of acquisition 
Panay Island Central Luzon 
P1 P2 P3 CL1 CL2 
Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. 
% Size % Size % Size % Size % Size 
(ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) 
Inheritance of title 
or right 48.6 0.67 37.4 0.75 38.6 0.63 37.5 1.28 32.6 1.27 
Husband 43.6 0.69 15.7 0.76 28.8 0.65 27.6 1.36 26. 2 1. 34 
Wife 5.0 0.50 21.70.74 9.8 0.56 9.9 1.09 6.4 0.99 
Offered by landowner 43.3 0.82 36.7 0.68 46.6 0.64 32.7 2.20 42.3 3.46 
Purchase of title 5.5 0.44 17. 3 0.73 9.8 0.57 3.1 1. 88 
Purchase of right 1. 6 1.50 6.1 1. 53 6.1 1. 88 
Exchange 0.5 0.45 1. 9 1. 75 1. 6 1. 90 
Pawned-in 4. 9 0.41 5.1 0.36 6.8 0.85 7.0 1. 23 
Others 2.5 1.0 1. 5 0.68 1. 6 0.50 7.2 0.98 
Total area cultivated 39.8 92.3 63.6 188.9 122.51 
(ha) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
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TABLE A.4. Probability of parents making land bequests, probit estimatesa 
Dependent variable: Probability of land bequest 
Intercept 
Education (years of schooling) 
Father 
Mother 
Size of land owned (ha) 
Father 
Mother 







No. of observations 
*significant at a= 




. . f 0 01s1gn1 icant at a= .. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
.24 .15 - .01 - .08 
(2.05) (1. 22) ( - .11) (-.46) 
- .01 - .03 - .01 - .03 
(-.45) ( -1. 06) (-.47) (-.95) 
- .16 - . 02 - .02 - . 02 
(-.48) (-.46) (-.45) (-.47) 
.03 .04* 











. 81 *** 
(3.00) (3.18) 
.36* .26 
(1. 74) (1.27) 
. 37* .19 
(1. 62) (.80) 
-215.83 -209.61 -208.76 -202.90 
331 331 331 331 
aProbability of parents bestowing land to at least one child. 
